Abstract. A TU-game in characteristic function form generates a unique minimal dominant set. This set is non-empty.
Introduction
The core of a cooperative game collects those feasible outcomes that no group of players can improve upon by acting for themselves. Put differently, once an agreement in the core has been reached, no coalition could gain by regrouping. The core as a solution is static in nature and remains silent on whether and on how a core outcome is reached. Following Harsányi (1974), we presuppose some bargaining process among the players. At first, one of the players proposes some payoff vector. Then, some coalition, say C, may make a counter proposal in order to obtain a higher payoff. Of course, this deviating coalition must have the power to achieve the payoffs they are proposing to themselves. Such a counter proposal is said to dominate the initial proposal via coalition C. Then again, another coalition may propose still another payoff vector, and so forth. Wu (1977) showed the existence of a bargaining scheme that converges to the core and rephrased this result as 'the core is globally stable'. We refine her analysis and show that the bargaining process, on condition that it is well guided, reaches the core in a finite number of steps. We say that core is accessible.
Furthermore, we slightly enlarge the set of feasible outcomes and we show that this accessibility result extends to the coalition structure core. More precisely, feasibility usually presupposes that the grand coalition is formed and imposes that the total payoff amounts to the value of this grand coalition. In contrast, we do not assume that the grand coalition forms: a payoff vector is feasible as soon it can be achieved via some partitioning of the grand coalition. The coalition structure core collects all undominated outcomes.
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Our first result characterises the coalition structure core:
The coalition structure core, if non-empty, is the smallest set of outcomes that satisfies accessibility. Similar to the core, the coalition structure core has an important shortcoming: nonemptiness is far from being always guaranteed. Nevertheless, we motivate a solution that applies to games with an empty coalition structure core. Starting point is the R-admissible set of Kalai, Pazner and Schmeidler (1976) . We insist on the accessibility and we impose a closure axiom: in case the initial outcome belongs to the solution, then the dominating outcomes also belong to the solution. The intuition behind this axiom is straightforward. If the coalition structure core is empty, then there are no undominated 'outcomes', but there might exist undominated 'sets' of outcomes. Such a set must be closed for domination.
A set of outcomes that combines accessibility and closure is said to be dominant. Our second result investigates the solution induced by dominant sets:
The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is well-defined and non-empty, and coincides with the coalition structure core in case it is non-empty. In other words, the minimal dominant set is a non-empty coalition structure core-extension.
The next section collects preliminaries and introduces the coalition structure core. Section 3 studies dominating chains and proves our first result.
Section 4 shows that for abstract games the minimal dominant set and the dynamic solution coincide. Section 5 translates Shenoy's dynamic solution to the framework of TU-games and studies dominant sets. Section 6 closes the paper.
Preliminaries
We introduce the notation and define games, outcomes, domination, and a core concept. As we do not assume that the grand coalition forms our notion of outcome slightly differs from the usual notion of imputation.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of n players. Non-empty subsets of N are called coalitions. A partition is a set of pairwise disjoint coalitions so that their union is N and represents the breaking up of the grand coalition N . For a partition P = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C m } and a coalition C, the partners' set P (C, P) of C in P is defined as the union of those coalitions in P that have a non-empty intersection with C:
A characteristic function v : 2 N \{∅} −→ R assigns a real value to each coalition. The pair (N, v) is said to be a transferable utility game in characteristic function form, in short, a
game. An outcome of a game (N, v) is a pair (x, P) with x in R n and P a partition of N . The vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) lists the payoffs of each player and has to satisfy
with x(C) = j∈C x j . The first condition is known as individual rationality: player i will cooperate to form a coalition only if his payoff x i exceeds the amount he would get on his own. The second condition combines feasibility and the myopic behaviour of the players, it states that each coalition in the partition P allocates its value among its members. In case the grand coalition forms, then an outcome is a pair (x, P) with P = {N }, x i ≥ v({i}), and x(N ) = i∈N x i = v(N ). As such, outcomes generalise imputations. Outcomes with the same payoff vector are said to be payoff equivalent. The set of all outcomes of the game (N, v) is denoted by Ω (N, v) . The set Ω(N, v) contains the outcome in which the grand coalition is split up in singletons and is therefore non-empty. Now, let us define domination. An illustration and an interpretation follows.
Definition 2.1. Let x, y ∈ R n and let C be a coalition. Then, vector x dominates y by C, denoted by x > C y, if -for each player i in C we have x i ≥ y i , and -for at least one i in C we have x i > y i . Let (N, v) be a game and let a = (x, P) and b = (y, Q) be two outcomes. Then, outcome a dominates b by C if -P contains C, -P contains all coalitions in Q that do not intersect C, -the payoff vector x dominates y by C, and -the restrictions of x and y to the set of players outside P (C, Q) coincide. Outcome a dominates b if P contains a coalition C such that a dominates b by C.
Consider a four-player game where only coalitions of size two have a positive value equal to 2. Here, the outcome a = ((1, 1, 0, 0); {1, 2} , {3} , {4}) does not dominate the outcome b = ((0, 0, 1, 1); {1} , {2} , {3, 4}). Moving from b towards a improves the payoffs of players 1 and 2, but affects the coalition structure and the payoffs of players 3 and 4. On the other hand, the outcome d = ((1, 1, 1, 1); {1, 2} , {3, 4}) dominates both a and b. The binary relation 'domination' is unable to compare the payoff equivalent outcomes ((1, 1, 1, 1); {1, 3} , {2, 4}) and d.
Although the framework is static, domination should be interpreted in a dynamic way. Let a = (x, P) dominate b = (y, Q) by C. Then, if b is considered as the initial outcome, one can say that coalition C deviates and enforces the new outcome a. Indeed, coalition C separates from its partners in order to obtain higher payoffs. The players in P (C, Q) \ C become ex-partners of C. They may reorganise themselves and their payoffs might decrease when moving from b to a. In the worst case, these ex-partners fall apart in singletons. Finally, the outsiders, i.e. the players not in P (C, Q), are left untouched.
Definition (2.1) also models a merger or a breaking up. In the former case, the deviating coalition C is the union of some of the coalitions in the initial partition Q. In the latter case, an initial coalition is split up into two or more subcoalitions; each subcoalition that is better off in the new outcome can be considered as the deviating coalition.
As might be expected, the set of undominated outcomes deserves special interest.
Definition 2.2. Let (N, v) be a game. The coalition structure core C(N, v) is the set of undominated outcomes. Equivalently, the pair (x, P) is in the coalition structure core if and only if it satisfies feasibility and coalitional rationality:
(C), and -for each coalition S we have x(S) ≥ v(S).
Note that the coalition structure core might contain payoff equivalent outcomes. Also, in case the grand coalition forms, the coalition structure core includes the core. In addition, the linear programming problem to obtain the coalition structure core is very similar to the one behind the core. As a consequence the well-known Shapley-Bondareva conditions that guarantee a non-empty core extend to the present framework. We will not use these conditions. Therefore we state the result without explaining the notion of balanced collection (see, for example, Owen (1982), Chapter 8.) .
where P runs over all partitions of N . The number v * is called the value of the game (N, v). The value of a superadditive game is equal to the value of the grand coalition.
Proposition 2.3. The coalition structure core C(N, v) of a game (N, v) with value v * is non-empty if and only if for each balanced collection S we have
where the real numbers δ S are the balancing weights.
The coalition structure core is accessible
Let a group of players propose some outcome. If a coalition can obtain a higher payoff, it is allowed to deviate and to propose a second outcome, and so forth. This bargaining process gives rise to a 'dominating' sequence. We show that for each outcome there exists a dominating sequence that terminates in the coalition structure core. Let (N, v) be a game and let Ω = Ω(N, v) be the set of all outcomes. 
The integer k is said to be the length of (or the number of steps in) the dominating sequence.
The binary relation '←' is the transitive and reflexive closure of the relation 'domination'. Note that two different outcomes might be accessible from each other. The relation '←' describes a possible succession of transitions from one outcome to another. We are interested in the outcomes that appear at the end of these sequences.
Definition 3.2. Let ∆ be a set of outcomes. Then, ∆ is accessible from Ω if for each b in Ω there exists an a in ∆ such that a ← b.
Lemma 3.3. Let (N, v) be a game with a non-empty coalition structure core. Then, the coalition structure core is accessible.
Proof. Let b 0 = (y 0 , Q 0 ) be an outcome that is not in C (N, v) . In case b 0 is dominated by an outcome in C (N, v) , the proof is done. In case no outcome in C(N, v) dominates b 0 , we look for a dominating sequence that terminates in the core. The proof is split up in different steps. First, we indicate how to detect those players that can be blamed for not being able to go to the core in one step. Then, we define a sequence of suitable deviations and show that the core is reached after a finite number of steps. As a matter of fact, we rule out the case that this dominating sequence has an infinite length.
Step 1. Defining the set of overpaid players. Interpret b 0 = (y 0 , Q 0 ) as the initial outcome. Let a = (x, P) be a core outcome. A player i for which y 0i > x i is said to be overpaid relative to a. Let O(b 0 , a) collect these overpaid players. Since b 0 is not dominated by a, the set O(b 0 , a) is non-empty. Now, we consider the collection of core outcomes that minimise the number of overpaid players. Within this collection, we look for an outcome a *
. We consider a * as a core outcome close to b 0 .
Step 2. Selecting a deviating coalition. Since the outcome b 0 = (y 0 , Q 0 ) is not in the core there exists at least one blocking coalition, i.e. a coalition C for which v(C) > y 0 (C). We select a deviating coalition C as follows. First, we inspect the coalitions in the partition P * and we look for a blocking coalition C among P * . Next, if the partition P * does not contain a blocking coalition, then the outcome b 0 satisfies y 0 (N ) = v * and is said to be efficient (with respect to P * ), v * is the value of the game. In that case we select a minimal (for inclusion) blocking coalition.
Step 3. Defining a deviating outcome. In order to define the payoff vector in the deviating outcome b 1 = (y 1 , Q 1 ) we consider the different types of players separately. First, we deal with the deviating players. Since C blocks b 0 and a * is a core outcome, we know that y 0 (C) < v(C) ≤ x * (C). Let i ∈ C. The payoff y 1i depends upon whether or not C contains overpaid players.
(1) If C does not contain overpaid players, then we define
(2) If C does contain overpaid players, then we define
in case i is not overpaid.
In words, the deviating coalition divides the surplus v(C)−y 0 (C) among its members. The overpaid players are served first and consume the whole surplus. The non-overpaid players experience either a status quo or an improvement. Secondly, the ex-partners of C are assumed to split up into singletons. Hence, each player i in P (C, Q 0 )\C receives his value v({i}) as payoff. Of course, in a next step some of these ex-partners might merge.
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Thirdly, the outsiders remain untouched: if i / ∈ P (C, Q 0 ), then y 1i = y 0i . In conclusion: moving from b 0 to b 1 , the overpaid ex-partners of C become non-overpaid. In case b 1 is either a core outcome or dominated by a core outcome, the proof finishes. Otherwise, execute the next steps.
Step 4. An iteration. Step 5. Inspecting the infinite sequence. As the core is not reached the set of overpaid players finds its non-empty minimal form after a finite number of steps. Denote this set by O. The iteration procedure is unable to reduce O. Due to the selection criteria for the deviating coalition (Step 2) there is somewhere in the sequence an outcome b t = (y t , P t ) that is efficient with respect to P * and satisfies O t = O. Let us replace b t with b = (y = y t , P * ). We claim that the outcome b is in the core. Denote the partners' set of the overpaid players in P * by B, i.e. B = P (O, P * ), and the complement of B by A. Since A does not contain overpaid players and b is efficient with respect to P * , the restriction to A of the payoff vectors y and x * coincide:
We proceed the proof of the claim by contradiction. Let C be a blocking coalition. Obviously, C is not a subset of A. Hence C intersects B. LetC = P (C, P * ) be the partners' set of C. The efficiency of b implies that y(C) = v(C). Since O can not be reduced, the coalition C must contain all the overpaid players inC. Therefore,C \ C only contains non-overpaid players and satisfies y(C \C) ≤ x * (C \C). Use the efficiency of the outcome b together with the fact that a * is a core outcome to conclude that y(C) ≥ x *
(C) ≥ v(C).
Hence, C is not blocking. A contradiction.
In order to stress the impact of the particular construction in the above proof we give an example of a bargaining scheme that does not enter the coalition structure core.
Example 3.4. Let Γ α = ({1, 2, 3} , v) denote the three-player game, where each singleton has value 0, each pair has value 2, and v(N ) = α. Let α = 6. The core is non-empty. Nevertheless, the next three outcomes generate a cycle of dominating outcomes: ((1, 0, 1) , {1, 3} , {2}) , and ((0, 1, 1), {2, 3} , {1}) .
We close this section with a characterisation of the coalition structure core.
Theorem 3.5. The coalition structure core of a game, if non-empty, is the smallest (for inclusion) set of outcomes that satisfies accessibility.
Proof. Accessibility follows from the previous lemma. Furthermore, each outcome in the coalition structure core is undominated. This implies minimality.
The minimal dominant set
We look for a core-like solution that satisfies accessibility and that applies to games with an empty coalition structure core. We impose a second axiom, called closure: a dominating sequence cannot leave the solution, once it has entered the solution. A dominant set satisfies both axioms. We study some of their properties and show that the minimal dominant set is well-defined and is non-empty. Finally, we link the minimal dominant set and the coalition structure core. Let (N, v) be a game and let Ω = Ω(N, v) be the set of all outcomes. For example, the set Ω of all outcomes is dominant. Furthermore, the complement Ω \ ∆ of a dominant set ∆ is not dominant. The main goal of this section is to study the intersection of all dominant sets. As a starter, we look at the intersection of a finite number of dominant sets.
Lemma 4.2. The intersection of two dominant sets is dominant.
Proof. Let ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 be two dominant sets. Observe that the intersection ∆ 1 ∩ ∆ 2 is non-empty. Next, we check that this intersection satisfies accessibility and closure. These are easy exercises. We only treat the accessibility condition.
Let b be an outcome outside ∆ 1 . By the accessibility of ∆ 1 there exists an outcome a in ∆ 1 accessible from b. If a ∈ ∆ 2 , we are ready. If a / ∈ ∆ 2 , then the accessibility of ∆ 2 guarantees the existence of an outcome a in ∆ 2 accessible from a. By the closure property of ∆ 1 , outcome a also belongs to ∆ 1 . Hence a ∈ ∆ 1 ∩ ∆ 2 and a ← b.
In order to extend this finite intersection property, we use some topology. We embed the set Ω in the Euclidean space R n by neglecting the partitions behind the outcomes. Formally, we study outcome vectors x, y, . . . instead of outcomes (x, P), (y, Q) . . .. Observe that the set of all outcome vectors (i.e. the set Ω after neglecting the partitions) is compact, that is, bounded and closed. Of course, within the universe Ω we consider the relativisation of the Euclidean topology to Ω.
According to the previous lemma, the class D of dominant sets constitutes a filterbase in Ω. Indeed: ∅ / ∈ D; and if
Since Ω is compact, the set of accumulation points of D is not empty (Dugundji (1990) , Chapter XI). The next lemma allows us to concentrate on the intersection of all closed dominant sets.
Lemma 4.3. A minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is closed in the Euclidean topology.
Proof. Let ∆ be a minimal dominant set and let (y, Q) be an outcome outside ∆. There exists an outcome (x, P) and a coalition C in P such that x > C y. Example 4.6. Consider the game Γ α in (3.4) with 2 < α < 3. The minimal dominant set D is the union of two sets. The first one collects those outcomes (x, P) where the partition P splits up the grand coalition into a singleton and a pair, and where the payoff vectors belong to the boundary of the triangle spanned by (2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0) and (0, 0, 2). The second set collects outcomes (x, {N }) with x(N ) = α such that there exists i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that x i + x j > 2. (This is the closed surface of a triangle with another triangle cut out.)
The coalition structure core of this game is empty. Hence, the set D is unstable in the sense that each outcome in D is dominated (by outcomes in D). This example illustrates the impact of the myopic behaviour of the players. The average individual payoff obtained by forming the (unstable) grand coalition is equal to α/3 and is larger than the expected or the average individual payoff obtained in the minimal dominant set. Due to shortsightedness also non-efficient outcomes are considered.
From the previous section we know that the coalition structure core is accessible. As the coalition structure core collects the undominated outcomes, it also satisfies the closure property. Hence, the coalition structure core is dominant. Now, we show that each dominant set includes the coalition structure core. As a consequence, we obtain our second result.
Theorem 4.7. The minimal dominant set is a non-empty coalition structure core-extension. Proof. Let (N, v) be game with a non-empty coalition structure core C (N, v) . Let ∆ be a dominant set. Let b ∈ C(N, v) . Since ∆ is dominant, it contains an outcome a accessible from b. As b is undominated, the dominating chain is trivial and a = b. Therefore b ∈ ∆. As a consequence, the minimal dominant set and the coalition structure core coincide. In case (N, v) has an empty coalition structure core, the theorem follows from corollary (4.5). Definition 5.1. (Kalai et al. (1976) , definition 2) Let R be a binary relation on a finite set of alternatives, A. A subset B of A is an R-admissible set if it satisfies three conditions:
(1) For all a, b in B aRb if, and only if bRa, (2) For all a outside B there exists b ∈ B such that bRa, and (3) For all a outside and b ∈ B not aRb.
Conditions 2 and 3 correspond to the accessibility and closure conditions of dominant sets if R stands for accessibility. Condition 1 is implied by minimality. Subsequently Kalai, Pazner and Schmeidler prove the uniqueness of the R-admissible set for any transitive binary relation R. Note, however that this proof does not translate to the minimal dominant set as the set of outcomes Ω is not finite. 5.2. Shenoy's dynamic solution for abstract games. Shenoy (1979) introduced a dynamic solution for abstract games. In this framework, the minimal dominant set and the dynamic solution coincide.
Let us repeat some definitions. An abstract game is a pair (X, dom) with X a non-empty set whose members are called outcomes and 'dom' a binary relation in X. Let a, b be two outcomes. If (a, b) ∈ dom, we say that a dominates b. The transitive and reflexive closure of the relation 'dom' is denoted by '←'. In other words, a ← b (and we read 'outcome a is accessible from b') if either a = b or there is a dominating chain from b to a. Dominant sets are defined as before (Definition 4.1) and satisfy the finite intersection property (Lemma 4.2). In case the set X is finite, the minimal dominant set is well-defined and is non-empty. On the other hand, the dynamic solution is characterised as follows: Conditions (2) and (3) imply that the dynamic solution is a dominant set. Condition (1) is linked with the minimality requirement. 
Conclusion
Domination is a central tool when defining set solutions for cooperative games. Most of the time one-step or direct domination is considered. A typical example is the external stability axiom: a set of outcomes is externally stable if each outcome outside this set is directly dominated by at least one outcome in the set. The core lacks this property: an element outside the core might be dominated only by outcomes that are in turn dominated. Harsanyi (1974) argues that direct domination relations are not sufficient to look at. Longer domination chains should also be examined. This is exactly what is done in this paper: the coalition structure core (and its special case, the core) is externally stable when repeated domination is taken into account. This result provides a dynamic formulation of the core and justifies its use in coalition formation games.
Next, we tackled the problem of emptiness. We propose to look for the minimal dominant set. This set is well defined and is never empty. It can be interpreted as the set of outcomes the negotiation process is attracted to. In addition, if the coalition structure core is nonempty, then it coincides with this minimal dominant set. We consider this result as a support for the minimal dominant set as a solution.
In contrast to the core, dominant sets are (like the stable sets of von Neumann and Morgenstern) solutions as sets: the core is a set of stable outcomes, while a dominant set is a stable set of outcomes. As a consequence, the computation of dominant sets -in particular the minimal dominant set-is not trivial. We do not know whether an algorithm to find them is already developed.
